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Review of Exposure Draft of the Family
Law Amendment (Shared Parental
Responsibility) Bill 2005
An Exposure Draft of the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental
Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth)1 (the Bill) was released by the Federal
Attorney-General on 28 June 2005. The Attorney-General asked the House
of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs
(the Committee) to review the draft Bill and report by 11 August 2005. The
Committee in turn invited community submissions by 15 July 2005. The Bill
amends the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (FLA) by implementing a number of
recommendations of the 2003 ‘Every Picture Tells a Story’ report of the
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and Community
Affairs2 and subsequent government proposals put forward in the 2004 ‘New
Approach to the Family Law System’ discussion paper,3 with funding being
announced in the 2005–2006 Federal Budget.4 In essence, the changes
‘aim to bring about a cultural shift in how family separation is managed: away
from litigation and towards co-operative parenting’.5 The following comprises
a submission made to the Committee responding to the proposed changes,
slightly expanded where necessary to provide background information on
the proposals.
We write in response to your invitation for submissions on the above exposure
draft.
We have limited ourselves to specific comments on key issues of concern
that we have identified in the three weeks available for preparation of
submissions. Given the short (and we would argue, inadequate) time available
for consideration of the significant and complex range of changes contained in
the Bill, the fact that we have not mentioned a particular provision should not
necessarily be viewed as an indication of our support of it.
Most of the points made in our submission relate to our concern that the
Bill’s incorporation of improved provisions related to ‘safety’ will be
overwhelmed by the ‘equal parenting’ message in the overall scheme. A
number of the changes we suggest are aimed at ensuring that this does not
occur.
1 Available at: <aph.gov.au/house/Committee/laca/familylaw/index.htm>.
2 Inquiry of the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and Community
Affairs, Every Picture Tells a Story: Report on the Inquiry into Child Custody Arrangements
in the Event of Family Separation, December 2003, Canberra, <http://www.aph.gov.au/
house/committee/fca/childcustody/report.htm>.
3 A New Approach to the Family Law System, Implementation of Reforms, Discussion Paper,
Australian Government, November 2004, Canberra, <http://www.ag.gov.au/>.
4 <http://www.budget.gov.au/2005-06>.
5 Explanatory Statement to the Bill, available at: <aph.gov.au/house/
Committee/laca/familylaw/index.htm>.
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Schedule 1: Shared Parental Responsibility
Section 60B: Objects of Part and principles underlying it
The proposed changes to s 60B elevate the safety for children from one of the factors
contained in s 68F(2) to s 60B, the objects and principles section. Section 60B has
clearly set the tone for the interpretation of s 68F(2) and the rest of Pt VII of the FLA
since its introduction in 1996 (via the Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth)) (the
Reform Act) and the absence of any reference to safety in this important context has
arguably diminished consideration of family violence and abuse in parenting cases.
However, we have a number of concerns about the sequencing, wording and ambit
of the proposed changes to s 60B.
Section 60B(1)
The proposed changes to s 60B(1) do not include the object of ‘ensuring that
children are protected from physical or psychological harm’. As a result, the
emphasis is entirely on the importance of parental involvement in their
children’s lives. This is inconsistent with the proposal to attach dual primacy
to parental involvement AND protecting children from harm, set out in both
s 60B(2) and s 68F(1A).
We consider that it is critical that the reforms do not operate to compromise
children’s safety or continue their abuse, and to this end suggest that the
legislation should clearly convey (including in its ordering of potentially
competing principles) the priority to be given to ensuring children’s safety.
We recommend:
• Section 60B(1) be amended to provide, as the first object, ‘(a) to
ensure that children are protected from physical or psychological
harm’.
Section 60B(2)
We strongly support the inclusion of protection from harm caused by family
violence or child abuse in the principles in s 60B(2) although, as just
discussed, we consider that a more appropriate ordering would be to list the
matters in s 60B(2)(b) first, and the matters set out in s 60B(2)(a) second.
We are also concerned that s 60B(2)(b) uses the concept of ‘abuse’, which
is now defined in s 4(1) of the FLA rather than s 60D (which contains the
definition of ‘family violence’) (see Sch 4). The definition of ‘abuse’ has not
changed, but the word ‘abuse’ now carries much more weight than it did
previously. In our view, the existing definition of ‘abuse’ is too narrow for its
new role, and therefore has the effect of narrowing the scope of the principle
in s 60B(2)(b) (as well as the operation of other important provisions in which
it appears, including s 60I(8), s 61DA(2)(a), and s 68F(1A)). Most notably, the
definition does not extend to neglect, or ill-treatment (which, in contrast, does
appear in s 68F(1A)). The limited FLA definition of ‘abuse’ is in contrast to
the harms from which children are to be protected under the various State
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child protection regimes, which typically include abuse and neglect.6
Reference in s 60B(2)(b)(i) to ‘other behaviour’ is not sufficiently clear to
cover these harms.
We recommend:
• The ordering of s 60B(2) be changed, so that matters currently in
s 60B(2)(b) appear first, and the matters currently set out in
s 60B(2)(a) appear second.
• That, along with family violence and abuse, neglect and other
ill-treatment of children be included in s s 60B(2)(b).
Section 60I(8)(b) and s 60J(1): Family dispute resolution
in cases of child abuse and family violence
The effect of s 60I and s 60J is that, with limited exceptions, parties will have to
attend Family Dispute Resolution (FDR), or attend a family counsellor or FDR
practitioner, before the court will hear their application for a Pt VII order in relation
to a child.
We have a number of broader concerns about the introduction of
compulsory FDR. Where there is a significant power imbalance between the
parties, compulsory FDR may result in unjust processes and outcomes, as
parties of unequal bargaining power are forced to negotiate, giving stronger
parties ample opportunity to pressure weaker parties into capitulation. The
proposed process for obtaining an exemption to the requirement to attend FDR
under s 60I(8) (see later) is not adequate to eliminate many cases in which
there will exist a significant power imbalance between former partners, which
may result in unfair agreements. This situation may be exacerbated by the lack
of encouragement for parties using FDR under the Bill to seek legal advice,
as legal support may enable a weaker party to insist on a better deal.7
Voluntariness is also important to the success of FDR processes such as
mediation because willingness to participate is equated with good faith, and a
party compelled to attend mediation may fail to negotiate or even sabotage the
process, resulting in fewer agreements and possibly an abuse of process.8
Experiences in England and Wales suggest that compulsory FDR is unlikely
to be of use to most couples and that it may simply add to the cost of the
6 L Broomfield and D Higgins, ‘National Comparisons of Child Protection Systems’ (2005)
Child Abuse Prevention Issues (No 22), Australian Institute of Family Studies, Melbourne,
pp 4–5.
7 The Bill is silent on the issue of whether parties should seek legal advice in conjunction with
private dispute resolution (there is no section in the current or proposed legislative scheme
that requires or encourages mediating parties to seek the advice of lawyers). The
government’s New Approach, Discussion Paper, above n 3, p 6 states:
To help prevent joint sessions with a parenting adviser becoming adversarial, it is
proposed that a lawyer not be present during those sessions. Parents would still be able
to consult a lawyer if they wished, but the lawyer would not be part of the process at
Family Relationship Centres.
8 L Katz, ‘Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution: Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of
the Coin?’ (1993) Jnl of Dispute Resolution 1 at 53; G Smith, ‘Unwilling Actors: Why
Voluntary Mediation Works, Why Mandatory Mediation Might Not’ (1998) 36 Osgoode
Hall Law Jnl 847 at 875–9.
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family law system. Under s 29 of the UK Family Law Act 1996 parties were
not granted legal aid unless they attended a meeting with a mediator to
determine whether family mediation was suitable. In practice, this provision
meant that family mediation was compulsory in many cases.
After a government-commissioned evaluation of the pilot mediation
scheme, the provisions relating to family mediation were not brought into
force by the UK government. The evaluation found that the compulsory nature
of the referral to mediation at the early stages of litigation was not an effective
means of securing legal settlement. Mediation providers found that parties
compulsorily referred to mediation under s 29 were less committed to the
process and likely to break appointments, and were less likely to reach
agreement.9
The evaluation concluded that mediation was a useful process for some
cases but that where parties are forced into it and did not commit themselves
to the process, it was unlikely to be successful and proved an additional cost
to the system without achieving the goals of securing more agreements,
minimising conflict, and avoiding costly court procedures.10
It is disappointing that the Bill has been drafted without apparently paying
regard to the UK situation. It is hoped that a major, independent evaluation of
the reforms will be commissioned by the Attorney-General’s Department so
that the impact of the compulsory dispute resolution requirements can be
assessed.
Assuming that the government does not propose to reopen this issue, the
following suggestions relate to improving the procedure for assessing whether
FDR should take place.
The Bill provides that if under s 60I(8)(b) the court is satisfied that there are
‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that a party has committed child abuse or
family violence, it still must not hear the application unless the applicant files
a certificate that they have obtained information about the issues in dispute
from a family counsellor or family dispute resolution practitioner (s 60J(1))
unless (once again) the court is satisfied that there are ‘reasonable grounds’
(etc) for not requiring this. We are particularly concerned that these
provisions: create significant obstacles for victims of violence (including
delay); increase the risk (especially in cases involving allegations of child
sexual abuse) for systems abuse (meaning ‘the preventable harm [that] is done
to children in the context of policies and programmes which are designed to
provide adequate care and protection’);11 and will further discourage victims
of violence from raising these issues at all, and thus to inappropriately enter
the FDR process. The reluctance of victims of violence to disclose their
9 G Davis et al, Monitoring Publicly Funded Family Mediation: Report to the Legal Services
Commission, 2000, at 257.
10 Ibid, at 273.
11 J Cashmore, J Dolby and D Brennan, ‘Systems Abuse: Problems and Solutions’, NSW Child
Protection Council, Sydney, 1994, p 11, cited in Australian Law Reform Commission and
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Seen and Heard: Priority for Children
in the Legal Process, AGPS, Canberra, 1997.
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experiences12 was previously discussed in the submission made by a number
of us on the New Approach Discussion Paper.
Also, it is not at all clear how these sections would work in practice. For
example, how can the court be satisfied that there are ‘reasonable grounds to
believe’ (etc) unless it actually hears the application? It seems that the burden
of proof to establish ‘reasonable grounds’ will be on the party alleging harm,
but what will suffice to discharge it? What is the basis for the distinction drawn
between commission of abuse or family violence (s 60I(8)(b)(i)) and risk
thereof (s 60I(8)(b)(ii))?
We are also concerned that the proposed system set out in s 60I(7) and (8)
for determining whether FDR should take place centres around the judge (or
registrar or magistrate — our subsequent references are just to judges), and
does not impose any obligation on FDR practitioners to consider the
appropriateness for FDR of clients presenting to them for this purpose. Under
the provisions, the judge determines suitability for FDR, and whether an
exception to the requirement to attend FDR has been made out. Parties must
make a case and provide evidence to the judge to be exempted from the FDR
attendance requirement. All FDR practitioners need do is provide certificates
for those who have attended. There appears to be no requirement in the Bill
for FDR practitioners to make an assessment of suitability for mediation nor
the ability for FDR practitioners to reject a case for dispute resolution if they
feel it is inappropriate.
These proposed changes are in marked contrast to the present primary
dispute resolution system, which centres on the mediator. Presently, the
mediator (the forerunner of the FDR practitioner) is required under Reg 62 of
the Family Law Regulations 1984 to make an assessment of the suitability of
each case for mediation before dispute resolution can take place. The matters
taken into account by the mediator in making this assessment are broader than
the exceptions listed in proposed s 60I(8) and include the safety of the parties,
the risk of abuse to a child, the equality of bargaining power between the
parties and the psychological and physical health of the parties. Assessment
sessions are conducted separately with each party and usually take around an
hour each. The mediator, who must have a background in social work,
psychology, counselling or law, makes his or her assessment of the case for
mediation after spending time with each party and by drawing upon his or her
experience and training. If the mediator decides that mediation is
inappropriate, he or she must not conduct the mediation.
Finally, s 60I(8), unlike the present Reg 62, does not ask judges to consider
whether an inequality of bargaining power would make FDR inappropriate.
Section 60I(8)(e) requires a judge to consider whether parties are able to
participate effectively in FDR, but this provision is narrower than the terms of
the present Reg 62(2) and the other examples given in the subsection focus on
more superficial issues than bargaining power, such as the inability to attend
dispute resolution because of physical remoteness and disability. The narrow
wording of s 60I(8)(e) and the limited examples provided militate against any
12 For example, M Kaye, J Stubbs and J Tolmie, ‘Negotiating Child Residence and Contact
Arrangements Against a Background of Domestic Violence’, Griffith University Research
Report 1, Brisbane, 2003.
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consideration of the important issue of power imbalance between the parties
when determining whether FDR is appropriate. This means that FDR may take
place when it is inappropriate and is unlikely to be fair.
We recommend:
• Section 60I(7) be amended to include an additional provision that
allows for FDR practitioners to certify that the dispute was not
suitable for FDR.
• Section 60I(8) be amended to include the requirement for judges to
consider inequality of bargaining power (as is required of mediators
under Reg 62).
• Section 60I(9) not be introduced.
• Amendment of the Family Law Regulations (or the FLA see next
point) so that FDR practitioners are required to conduct information
and assessment sessions for clients in parenting cases, to determine
whether FDR would be appropriate.
• Reg 62 of the Family Law Regulations should remain in place as the
basis on which suitability to attend FDR is assessed by FDR
practitioners. However, the wording of the Regulation should be
adjusted to reflect the change in terminology (eg, community and
private mediators to FDR practitioners) brought about by the Bill. It
is arguable that this critical provision dealing with exclusions from
mediation processes should not be placed in the rarely accessed
Regulations, but rather should be positioned in Subdivision E of the
FLA where its relevance and importance is then given greater
visibility.
• Section 60J not be introduced.
Section 63DA: Obligations of advisers
Section 63DA provides that if an adviser (defined in s 63DA(3) to cover legal
practitioners, family counsellors, FDR practitioners, and family and child
specialists) gives advice or assistance to people regarding parental responsibility of
a child after relationship breakdown, the adviser must inform the people that they
may enter into a parenting plan. If an adviser provides advice on parenting plans, the
adviser must inform the people s/he advises that they could consider the option of
the child spending substantial time with each parent.
This provision omits any necessity on the part of advisers to inquire about
a history of family violence, and child abuse, neglect, and ill-treatment, in the
relationship. If advisers are to do their jobs in a manner consistent with the
increasing emphasis being given in the FLA to protecting children from harm
(including the introduction of a two-track system in which matters involving
the risk of harm to a child should be referred straight to court), the obligation
on advisers to inquire about a history of family violence and child abuse,
neglect and ill-treatment should be part of the screening process. This is
particularly important given that, as noted earlier, victims are reluctant to
spontaneously reveal such issues.
Further, the Bill does not appear to contain any provision to ensure that
FDR practitioners (s 10J) or advisers providing information about making
parenting plans (s 63DA(3)), have the requisite training and expertise that
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would enable the ready appreciation and recognition of the existence and
impact of past or potential family violence and child abuse, neglect or
ill-treatment. The appropriate recognition of past or potential harm of this
nature is particularly important in light of empirical research indicating that
family violence is not a rare phenomenon,13 that there is evidence of the
coexistence of family violence and child abuse,14 and that victims of family
violence are reluctant to notify practitioners or courts of the existence or
severity of family violence.15
More generally, we would question the fragmented approach apparently
being taken in relation to the introduction of the changes related to FDR — for
example, obligations of advisers are set out in s 63DA, but the requirements
to be complied with by FDR practitioners are being left to the Regulations
(s 10R). We would support requirements regarding the training, qualifications
and obligations of the key decision makers in all non-court services being set
out in one place, either in the Regulations (as is currently the case) or
preferably, in the FLA (see earlier).
We recommend:
• The FLA (or the Family Law Regulations), be amended to cover
requirements regarding the training, qualification, and obligations of
key decision makers in non-court services as a result of the FDR
changes.
• At a minimum, amendment of s 63DA(1) and (2) to include, as a first
requirement, that advisers must consider the risk of family violence,
as well as child abuse, neglect, or ill-treatment, and where this risk
exists, refer directly to the court.
Section 64B(2): Matters with which a parenting order may
deal
Section 64B(2) lists the matters with which a parenting order may deal. Consistent
with the Bill’s emphasis on shared parenting and non-legal dispute resolution, and
the proposed abandonment of the terms ‘residence’ and ‘contact’ (Sch 5) (see later),
this list has been extended considerably .
Regarding the ordering of s 64B(2), given that ‘time’ and ‘communication’
comprise the central aspects of ‘contact’, it would be preferable for
s 64B(2)(b) (‘time’) to be followed by what is currently s 64B(2)(e)
(‘communication’). It is important that all potential decision-makers are clear
about the full range of options available. One of those options is that what is
13 For example, R Alexander, Domestic Violence in Australia, Federation Press, Annandale,
2002; M Eriksson and M Hester, ‘Violent Men as Good-Enough Fathers?’ (2001) Violence
Against Women 779.
14 For example, Kaye, Stubbs and Tolmie, above n 12; A Shea Hart, ‘Children Exposed to
Domestic Violence: Undifferentiated Needs in Australian Family Law’ (2004) 18 AJFL 170;
K Rendell, Z Rathus and A Lynch, An Unacceptable Risk: A Report on Child Contact
Arrangements Where There is Violence in the Family, Women’s Legal Service Inc, Brisbane,
2000; T Brown, M Frederico, L Hewitt and R Sheehan, Violence in Families. The
Management of Child Abuse Allegations in Custody and Access Disputes before the Family
Court of Australia, Monash University, Melbourne, 1998.
15 Kaye, Stubbs and Tolmie, above n 12.
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currently understood as a child’s ‘contact’ with one parent be limited to
arrangements which do not include physical proximity.
We recommend:
• The ordering of s 64B(2) be changed, so that the current s 60B(2)(b)
is followed by what is currently s 64B(2)(e).
Section 65DAA: Court to consider child spending
substantial time with each parent in certain circumstances
Section 65DAA provides that the court must consider making an order that the child
spend substantial time with each parent, if: a parenting order says (or will say) that
parents have joint parental responsibility for the child (s 65DAA(1)(a)); both parents
wish to spend substantial time with the child; and it is reasonably practicable for this
to occur. The note to s 65DAA says that the child’s best interests will still be the
paramount consideration when the court decides whether to go on to make a
‘substantial shared time’ order.
Section 65DAA(1)(a) is intended to ensure that cases involving family
violence or abuse are excluded. However, the simple exclusion of cases where
joint parental responsibility has not been granted does not provide an adequate
legislative framework for what is likely to be one of the most contentious
provisions of the Bill. The factors which militate against joint parental
responsibility are not identical to the factors which militate against the very
different notion of shared time.
The current position is that the court must already consider not only the
parties’ proposals but also any other appropriate arrangements.16 The
practicalities of shared parenting must also already be considered. Section 65E
is the touchstone for decisions. Section 65DAA(1), which is parent rather than
child focused, is therefore unnecessary and we would argue inappropriate.
Preferably, s 65DAA should not be introduced.
However, if the decision is made to implement s 65DAA it is relevant to
consider that many jurisdictions which promote shared parenting time set out
clear contra-indicators and strong positive features which must be present
before an order can be made which entails a child moving regularly between
two households for substantial periods of time. For example, the Revised
Code of Washington sets out three major pre-requisites to such an order being
made:17
• That there are no contra-indicators, such as abuse and violence;18
• That the order is in the best interests of the child;19 and
• A set of logical positive features;20
– That the parties have a satisfactory history of cooperation
16 U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238; 191 ALR 289.
17 Revised Code of Washington (RCW) can be found at <http://www.leg.wa.gov/RCW> —
particularly Title 26 RCW Domestic Relations.
18 This refers to restrictions relevant to residential order listed in RCW 26.09.191 factors, an
extensive list which tends to relate to abuse and violence.
19 RCW 26.09.002.
20 RCW 26.09.187 3(a)(i)–(vii).
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– A history of shared performance of parenting functions [This
can include an examination of the pre-separation roles played
by each of the parents]
– Geographic proximity
These criteria are consistent with the findings of recent research conducted
by the Australian Institute of Family Studies regarding the features of
successful shared time arrangements.21
We recommend:
• Section 65DAA not be introduced, or at a minimum be amended to
provide similar guidance to the Revised Code of Washington as to
when substantially shared time is appropriate.
Section 65DAC and s 60D(1)(e): Requirement that
parents decide jointly about ‘significant changes to the
child’s living arrangements’
Read together, s 60D(1)(e) and s 65DAC require parents to take jointly decisions
about ‘significant changes to the child’s living arrangements’.
The child’s living arrangements are the same as the living arrangements of
the parent with whom that child lives. The Explanatory Statement accurately
predicts that parents will try to use this section to control relocations by the
other parent and says s 60D(1)(e) is not intended to cover situations where the
child relocates to another residence within the ‘same locality’ unless this
produces ‘significant change’ (p 5). However, it is unclear what the words
significant change and same locality might mean and thus the extent to which
the ability of mothers to relocate with the children, or to re-establish
themselves in other ways post-separation, might become more limited. For
example, the words significant change might mean: a new person living in the
same house as the child; the style of the child’s accommodation changing
dramatically; and so on. Is this section to mean that a parent remarrying and
moving into new (perhaps substantially better) accommodation with a new
spouse (and perhaps step siblings) is required to make this decision jointly
with the child’s other parent? That scenario would be squarely covered by this
subsection (and indeed is envisaged in part in the Explanatory Statement
which refers to substantial changes to the type of the child’s accommodation).
Indeed, a carer parent not receiving child support from a payer parent, and
thus suffering financial hardship, could in effect be required to negotiate with
the parent as to whether they could move to cheaper accommodation — and
vice versa, a payer of child support struggling to meet payments and maintain
their accommodation would face the same requirement. And what is the same
21 B Smyth (ed), Parent-Child Contact and Post-Separation Parenting Arrangements,
Australian Institute of Family Studies, Melbourne, 2004. Available at Child Contact –
Research Report No 9 2004 – Publications – Australian Institute of Family Studies,
<aifs.gov.au/institute/pubs/resreport9/main.html>. These factors are found also in the case
law: see Foster and Foster [1997] FLC 90-281 and Forck & Thomas (1993) 16 Fam LR 516.
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locality? — we are aware of parents seeking orders to restrain moves of other
parents between suburbs.22
Currently, if parents have a parenting order, and the move of one parent
would impinge on the other parent’s right to care for the child under the order,
then the order already provides sufficient protection. If there is no order in
force, then a parent is perfectly entitled to seek an order to restrain a move.
A section requiring a parent to negotiate with the child’s other parent as to
where and under what conditions they will live is highly intrusive and will
provide an opportunity for parents to try to exercise control unreasonably over
the other parent of their child. This is particularly so in the case of a broadly
worded section such as this, which just refers to significant changes to living
arrangements. Section 60D(1)(e) is unworkable and unnecessary and should
not be introduced.
We would also question the utility of creating legal obligations that are in
reality fictional, such as s 65DAC(3)(b). It is one thing to oblige parents to
consult each other, it is another to oblige them in the way set out in
s 65DAC(3)(b). In our view, exhortations regarding desired parental
behaviour should be characterised that way in the FLA, not as fictional legal
obligations. If this subsection is intended to create a legal obligation, then in
our view it would be inappropriate and too vague.
Section 68F: Changes to the ‘best interests’ checklist
The Exposure Draft introduces a two-tiered approach for determining the best
interests of children. The first tier (s 68F(1A)) comprises two primary
considerations: the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both
parents, and the need to protect the child from physical and psychological harm. The
second tier (s 68F(2)) comprises the original s 68F(2) ‘best interests’ checklist, with
some important changes.
Section 68F(1A): Primary ‘best interests’ considerations
Section 68F(1A) mirrors the new s 60B(2) in making ongoing contact with
both parents and protection from violence and abuse equally important (so,
once again, we consider that protection from harm should be listed first).
However, the wording of s 68F(1A)(b) is different from that of s 60B(2)(b).
Section 60B(2)(b) refers to protection from harm caused by being subjected or
exposed to ‘abuse or family violence or other behaviour’, while s 68F(1A)(b)
refers to protection from harm caused by being subjected or exposed to
‘abuse, ill-treatment, violence or other behaviour’. The wording of
s 68F(1A)(b) is the same as the old s 68F(2)(g), but this does not explain why
the wording of s 60B(2)(b) is different.
We would prefer to see a consistent approach being taken in the FLA when
describing the types of harm from which there is a need to protect children. As
22 The most relevant reported case is D v SV (2003) 30 Fam LR 91, in which the Full Court
allowed the mother to relocate with the three children of the marriage (boys aged 13, 11, and
9) from the Melbourne suburb of Vermont South to Drysdale, 115 km away, where her new
partner had some significant connections. The court, at 97, expressed the view that: ‘Where
the move is over a relatively short distance such as this one, we would caution against the
making of orders that restrict the residence parent’s freedom of movement. The inquiry
should be directed more at alternative contact or shared residence arrangements.’
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discussed earlier, we consider that ‘ill-treatment’ should also be included in
s 60B(2)(b). Second, the fact that s 68F(1A)(b) uses the term ‘violence’ rather
than ‘family violence’ is problematic, since the term ‘family violence’ is
defined in the FLA (s 60D), but ‘violence’ is not. Consequently, s 68F(1A)(b)
needs to be amended to use the term ‘family violence’ rather than just
‘violence’.
Section 68F(2)(ba): The ‘friendly parent’ criteria
The Bill introduces s 68F(2)(ba) — the ‘friendly parent’ criterion — to the effect that
the court must consider ‘[t]he willingness and ability of each of the child’s parents
to facilitate, and encourage, a close and continuing relationship between the child
and the other parent’.
We commend the recognition in the ‘best interests’ checklist of the
importance of safeguarding children from abuse by designating the need for
protection from violence as a ‘primary’ consideration in s 68F(1A). However,
we are concerned that this protection will be undermined by the inclusion of
s 68F(2)(ba) as an ‘additional consideration’. This provision contradicts the
concern about exposure to family violence in s 60B(2)(b) and is in direct
conflict with the ‘primary’ consideration in s 68F(1A)(b), since a parent who
is properly and appropriately seeking to protect a child from the effects of
family violence will by definition not be willing to facilitate and encourage a
close and continuing relationship between the child and the other parent. It is
critical that the reforms do not operate to compromise children’s safety or
continue their abuse in the aftermath of separation by generating an
expectation that parents should attempt to cooperate with a violent spouse or
partner.
As discussed in our submission in response to the New Approach
Discussion Paper (see earlier) Dr Rae Kaspiew’s recent research23 shows that
attitudes to the other parent are already examined by the court in the context
of assessing ‘parental attitudes’ more widely under FLA s 68F(2)(h). This
provision requires the court to consider ‘the attitude to the child, and to the
responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated by each of the child’s parents’.
The research suggests that it has become a highly influential consideration
under the Reform Act with adverse consequences for the positioning of
mothers and the safety of children in circumstances where the court has been
faced with increased applications for contact in cases involving domestic
violence.24 The informal presumption in favour of contact in FLA s 60B(2)(b),
together with the changed bargaining dynamics under the Reform Act,25 mean
that it has become tactically dangerous for women to object to contact on the
23 R Kaspiew, ‘Mothers, Fathers and Parents: The Construction of Parenthood in
Contemporary Australian Family Court Decision Making’, PhD Thesis, University of
Melbourne, 2005. For further information on this study, see ‘Violence in Contested
Children’s Cases: An Empirical Exploration’, (2005) 19 AJFL 110.
24 A Shea Hart, above n 14; H Rhoades, R Graycar and M Harrison, The Family Law Reform
Act 1995: The First Three Years, University of Sydney and Family Court of Australia,
Sydney, 2000, at 5.24–5.35.
25 J Dewar and S Parker, Parenting, Planning and Partnership: The Impact of the New Part VII
of the Family Law Act 1975, Family Law Research Unit Working Paper No 3, Griffith
University Brisbane, 1999, p 74.
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grounds of domestic violence and abuse except in the most extreme
circumstances. Dr Kaspiew’s study showed that contact was not opposed even
in cases where children had been exposed to violence and abuse and fathers
had, for example, untreated mental illnesses, poor parenting skills and/or
inadequate parenting capacity.26 Details of this study were provided at the
request of the Family Pathways Branch when our submission regarding the
New Approach Discussion Paper was being considered.
Section 68F(2)(j): Relevance of family violence orders
The government proposes to change s 68F(2)(j) so that the court can only have
regard to final or contested family violence orders.
Proposed s 68F(2)(j) also directly contradicts the concerns about family
violence expressed in s 68B(2) and s 68F(1A). If a primary aim is to ensure
the child’s safety and protection from harm, then there is no basis on which to
direct the court to ignore interim ex parte family violence orders. All of the
available research (as opposed to anecdotal) evidence establishes that the great
majority of women applying for family violence orders have been subjected
to repeated incidents of violence before they approach the court for an order.27
Consequently, an interim ex parte order is in fact good evidence that violence
has occurred in the family over a period of time. Further, the criteria to be
satisfied before either a temporary or final protection order can be made vary
from State to State. This lack of uniformity makes it dangerous to distinguish
between the different categories of order. For these reasons, we consider that
it should be left to the discretion of the court to give such weight to any family
violence order as it considers appropriate.
The history of care for the child
At present, no changes are proposed in relation to s 68F(2) to reflect the importance
for the child of the ‘status quo’ — ie, maintaining stability in the patterns of
satisfactory past/existing care arrangements of the child.
We consider that the ‘best interests’ checklist should include as a relevant
factor the need to consider ‘the history of care for the child’. This factor was
recommended for inclusion in Canada’s Divorce Act by the Canadian
government’s Final Report on Custody and Access in 2002, which followed
several years of consultations and government-commissioned research.28 This
consideration recognises the importance to children in the post-separation
period of minimising, as far as practicable, disruption to the routines with
which they are familiar.
26 Kaspiew, ‘Mothers, Fathers, and Parents’, above n 23, pp 102–14.
27 Eg, J Stubbs and D Powell, Domestic Violence: Impact of Legal Reform in NSW, NSW
Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, Sydney, 1989, p 83; R Wearing, Monitoring the
Impact of the Crimes (Family Violence) Act 1987, LaTrobe University, Melbourne, 1992;
L Trimboli and R Bonney, An Evaluation of the NSW Apprehended Violence Order Scheme,
NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, Sydney, 1997, p 31.
28 Canada, Putting Children First: Final Federal-Provincial-Territorial Report on Custody and
Access and Child Support, Department of Justice, Ottowa, November 2002.
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We recommend:
• The ordering in s 68F(1A) should be changed, so that the need to
protect the child from harm is stated as the first rather than the second
principle.
• The relevant forms of harm from which children are acknowledged
to be in need of protection should be stated consistently across
s 68F(1A) and s 60B(2)(b).
• The relevant forms of harm from which children need to be protected
should include family violence, and child abuse, neglect, and
ill-treatment.
• Section 68F(2)(ba) not be introduced.
• Section 68F(2)(j) not be amended.
• The s 68F(2) ‘best interests’ checklist include as a relevant factor the
need to consider ‘the history of care for the child’.
Schedule 3: Amendments relating to the conduct of
child-related proceedings
The Exposure Draft introduces a number of changes to encourage less adversarial
conduct of child-related matters, which can also be applied to other proceedings with
the consent of all the parties.
We are concerned by the decision to mandate less adversarial processes for
dealing with child-related proceedings in court. According to the Explanatory
Statement, this approach ‘largely reflects that taken by the Family Court of
Australia in its pilot of the Children’s Cases Program’ (CCP). This decision is
premature, given that evaluations of the CCP are not complete, and that it is
as yet unclear whether this model is appropriate for separating families who
use the court system.
The CCP evaluations are being conducted by Professor Rosemary Hunter
and Dr Jenn McIntosh, and involve wide-ranging consultations with
stakeholders including the court, parties to cases, solicitors, barristers and
child representatives, the Legal Aid Commission of NSW, and community
organisations. The evaluations focus on 100 pilot CCP cases finalised at the
Sydney and Parramatta Registries of the Family Court, together with a
matched group of 100 control cases from each registry finalised during the
same period. Since not all of the pilot and control cases are as yet completed,
there is insufficient data available to draw reliable conclusions on questions
such as:
• whether the CCP is effective in dealing with cases involving
domestic violence and child abuse, which will form the core caseload
of the Family Court under the proposed amendments
• what Family Court litigants think of the CCP process
• what impact CCP has on children and parent-child relationships
• the cost-benefit of CCP, and whether it can be sustained within the
resources available to the Family Court
• what options and variations in the implementation of the CCP model
represent ‘best practice’.
We are also mindful of recent English research on parenting disputes in
court, which has raised a concern that the emphasis on diverting parents from
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court hearings might mean that the service needs of those parents who need
the security of a full court process may be compromised.29 In light of this
concern and the lack of knowledge about the impact of the CCP, we
recommend that consideration of the implementation of Sch 3 be postponed
pending the outcome of the CCP evaluations.
We recommend:
• Proposals in the Bill to mandate less adversarial proceedings be
deferred until the evaluation of the Children’s Cases Program has
been completed and the findings carefully considered.
Section 60KG: Rules of evidence do not apply unless
court decides
Section 60KG changes the rules of evidence so that, in essence, most of the rules of
evidence will not apply unless the court decides that to do so would be in the child’s
best interests.
Professor Hunter’s evaluation research on the CCP to date indicates that a
relatively low proportion of eligible children’s cases entered the CCP pilot in
Sydney and Parramatta when the opportunity was offered to take this course,
and that many of the strongest supporters of CCP in the legal profession
nevertheless consider that CCP is not suitable for all types of children’s cases.
One of the reasons for parties declining to enter CCP and for legal
professionals expressing reservations about CCP is that the suspension of
provisions of the Evidence Act is considered problematic when issues arise
that require proper testing by means of admissible evidence and
cross-examination. This is particularly the case with serious allegations of
child abuse or domestic violence. A father accused of abusing his child does
not want to have the allegations determined in a context in which hearsay,
tendency and character evidence may be admitted. It is also problematic that
any criminal charges, such as allegations of child sexual abuse, will be dealt
with under relevant State or Territory criminal legislation, and therefore
possibly under different evidentiary laws (in States that have not yet adopted
the Uniform Evidence Act that applies in the Family Court).
On the other hand, giving the court the discretion to apply the rules of
evidence to an issue in the proceedings is also problematic, as it will create
scope for greater adversarialism as parties seek to put arguments to the trial
judge as to whether or not the rules of evidence should be applied to a
particular issue. This same tendency has been observed in other contexts
where the rules of evidence prima facie do not apply.30
The only obvious solution to this dilemma is to make procedural options
available rather than mandating a single type of procedure.
We recommend
• Section 60KG not be introduced.
29 C Smart, V May, A Wade and C Furniss, Residence and Contact Disputes in Court, Vol 2,
Department of Constitutional Affairs, London, June 2005, p 89.
30 See, eg, R Hunter, ‘Evidentiary Harassment: The Use of the Rules of Evidence in an
Informal Tribunal’ in M Childs and L Ellison (Eds), Feminist Perspectives on Evidence,
Cavendish Press, London, 2000, p 105.
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Schedule 5: Removal of references to residence and
contact
Schedule 5 removes references to ‘residence’ and ‘contact’ in legislation including
the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 and the FLA, replacing these with ‘lives
with’ (for residence) and ‘cares for’, ‘spends time with’ or ‘communicates with’ (for
‘contact’).
Underlying the proposal to remove references to ‘residence’ and ‘contact’
is a conflict between the government’s desire to emphasise parental
responsibility, and the practical reality that children’s arrangements often
need to be thought about in terms of time, eg, when contact agreements/orders,
and child support liabilities (modifications to the formula and departure
orders), are being worked out. In the context of child support, the proposal to
use the term ‘care’ when it is often ‘time’ that is being described is confusing.
Replacing ‘contact’ with ‘care’ also has the potential to further undermine the
position of women who have been primary carers of their children, and to give
fathers greater acknowledgement than may be warranted, especially in its
assumption that ‘contact’ is always the same as ‘care’ — a proposition
manifestly unsupported by the empirical evidence.
‘Contact’ and ‘residence’ are neutral terms which describe the matters they
refer to in a more accurate and less confusing way than do the proposed
changes. The existing terminology should not be changed in the hope that
changing language can change the way people think — especially given that,
as acknowledged in the Explanatory Statement, this was so clearly not
achieved following changes to the Act in 1996.31
We recommend:
• Schedule 5 not be introduced.
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